CYBER SECURITY AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

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WHAT MAKES THE NUCLEAR SECTOR DIFFERENT?

- Potential consequences
- The role of the International Community
- Vulnerabilities
- Threat



POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES


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BUNCEFIELD OIL STORAGE DEPOT, UK


Aftermath of the explosions and fire in December 2005

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CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UKRAINE

- April 1986, a catastrophic power increase led to explosions in the core and a massive release of radioactivity
- · 31 deaths
- 350,000 people evacuated



'Atoms for Peace'

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

- Security is the responsibility of Member States
- The IAEA provides guidance for 'consideration by States, competent authorities and operators'
- Aim is to prevent the theft of nuclear or other radioactive material and/or the sabotage of associated nuclear facilities

IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY GUIDANCE

NSS 20: Nuclear Security Fundamentals

NSS13: Nuclear Security Recommendations on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

NSS 17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities



Third Nuclear Security Summit after Washington 2010 and Seoul 2012

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMITS



VULNERABILITIES TO CYBER ATTACK



Unprecedented reliance on digital systems but unparalleled opportunities for Security by Design

NUCLEAR NEW BUILD

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Scenario I: Gathering Information to support a malicious act

Scenario 2: Attack disabling or compromising one or several computer systems

Scenario 3: Computer system compromise as a tool of coordinated attack

CYBER ATTACK SCENARIOS

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- Covert Agent
- Disgruntled Employee/User

INTERNAL THREATS

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- Recreational Hacker
- Militant opponent to nuclear power
- Disgruntled Employee/User (no longer employed)
- Organised Crime
- Nation State
- > Terrorist

EXTERNAL THREATS

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Natanz Nuclear Plant, Iran

STUXNET ATTACK

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IMPACT ON UK



RESPONSE

Computer Security Policy:

- Enforceable
- Achievable
- Auditable

RESPONSE

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Computer Security Plan

- Organisation and Responsibilities
- Asset Management
- Risk, Vulnerability and Compliance Assessment
- System Security Design and Configuration
 Management
- Operational Security Procedures
- Personnel Management

RESPONSE

- Penetration Testing
- Detect, Delay, Respond
- Post-incident Forensics
- Training
- Nuclear Security Culture

RESPONSE



and to conclude.....

AVOID COMPLACENCY!

NSS20

http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1590_ web.pdf

NSS 13

http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1481_ web.pdf

NSS 17

http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1527_ web.pdf

IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES

International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World

Vienna, Austria, 1 to 5 June 2015

http://wwwpub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/46530/International-Conference-on-Computer-Security-in-a-Nuclear-World-Expert-Discussion-and-Exchange

IAEA COMPUTER SECURITY CONFERENCE 2015